We investigate the pervasiveness of lying in professional contexts such as insurance fraud, tax evasion and untrue job applications. We argue that lying in professional contexts share three characterizing features: (1) the gain from the dishonest behavior is uncertain, (2) the harm that lying may cause to the other party is only indirect and (3) lies are more indirect lies by action or written statements. Conducted as a field experiment with a heterogenous group of participants during a University ''Open House Day'', our ''gumball-machineexperiment'' provides field evidence on how preferences for lying are shaped in situations typically found in professional contexts which we consider to be particularly prone to lying behavior compared to other contexts. As a key innovation, our experimental design allows measuring exact levels of cheating behavior under anonymous conditions. We find clean evidence that cheating is prevalent across all sub groups and that more than 32% of the population cheats for their own gain. However, an analysis of the cheating rates with respect to highest educational degree and professional status reveals that students cheat more than non-students. This finding warrants a careful interpretation of generalizing laboratory findings with student subjects about the prevalence of cheating in the population.
Introduction
Cheating is ubiquitous in daily life and professional contexts. According to numbers provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation the total costs of insurance fraud (non-health insurance) is estimated to be more than 40 billion USD per year for the US. 2 The tax gap as an estimate of the foregone tax revenue in the US amounts to 345 billion USD for the year 2001 (Slemrod, 2007) , while cumulated losses until the year 2010 are estimated to be more than 3 trillion USD (Maffezzoli, 2011) . (1) The gain from the dishonest behavior is uncertain: In the experimental literature on cheating behavior, rewards are immediately received after dishonest behavior. In the professional contexts these rewards are typically risky as they depend on different context variables. Suppose for example promoting an employee to a higher rank. The candidate might state wrong information about his or her performance in the job which cannot be observed, but the promotion depends additionally on other factors, such as work experience, interpersonal skills, and popularity among other colleagues so that it is still uncertain whether the candidate will be promoted in the end. In our experiment we take account of this aspect by the fact that subjects can only cheat for a raffle ticket. The increase in income due to dishonest behavior is therefore uncertain and endogenously determined by the number of participants in each raffle. (2) The harm that lying may cause to the other party is only indirect: Gneezy (2005) reports that subjects are less willing to lie on the expense of others. Typical coin toss or die-roll experiments imply that subjects are able to increase their payoffs by cheating on the expense of the experimenter. The experimenter in our field study which will be described in detail in the experiment section, has already committed herself to raffle the monetary prizes in form of Amazon giftcertificates and is therefore not affected by the decision of the subject. Similarly, in business organizations others are more indirectly affected by dishonest behavior of organizational members, e.g. stockholders bear the damage when employees behave immorally and firm assets are involved. In our experiment, cheating for a raffle ticket implies that others are affected in terms of lower chances to win the raffle but not directly in terms of money. Shalvi (2012) provides evidence about preferences for lying to increase chances in a lottery. Similarly to Hegarty and Sims (1978) he found that lying is particularly likely when subjects had a chance to turn the possibility of a loss into a gain. Some of the major differences with our study are that subjects in his experiment had to participate as a compulsory course requirement, lotteries with purely negative outcomes were possible and only two 10 USD prizes were chosen among a multiple of 366 lottery tickets, so that the single probability of winning the prize was rather low. (3) Lies are not open lies in the face of an interrogator but more indirect by certain actions or written statements which get noticed with some delay. The majority of laboratory experiments investigate the relevance of cheap talk which directly involves lying to a third person or the experimenter if the subject wants to cheat (Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Gneezy, 2005) . This is different when considering dishonest behavior in business organizations where organizational members rarely lie openly to their personal advantage and rather manipulate reports or other business related documents. Thus, in business organizations lies are disguised in archives and accounting data. In our experimental design we will account for this by the fact that not only the task but also the reporting of the outcome are carried out in private. At the end of each round when participants show up in front of the raffle-drum, the experimenter neither knows whether the particular person cheated (information which will never be available) nor whether any person cheated at all in that raffle round (information which is available after the raffle).
In the next section we outline the experiment and derive our hypotheses in the third section. The forth section presents the results and the final section discusses our findings.
The gumball machine experiment
We conducted our experiment at the main campus of the University of Paderborn during the ''Open House Day'' which was organized by the University to celebrate its 40th anniversary in October 2012. The experiment was separated into independent, hourly rounds between 10:00 am and 05:00 pm where the monetary prize of one round was allotted only among those subjects who participated in that round. In each of the 7 rounds, we raffled a monetary prize of 100€ in form of an Amazon gift-certificate. Implementing this random incentive system that only a few subjects get paid, is well established in individual choice experiments. For example, it is common practice to pay only one or few subjects in lottery experiments in which risk preferences are elicited with a multiple price list format (see for example, Dohmen, Falk, Huffmann, & Sunde, 2010; Harrison, Lau, & Rutström, 2007) or in lottery experiments investigating determinants of intertemporal decision-making (Langer & Weber, 2008) . Additionally, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) , Bolle (1990) show that subject's behavior under the random incentive system is statistically not different from the deterministic reward case where all subjects get paid for their decisions. Our mobile laboratory consisted of two identical stations surrounded by high partition walls to ensure anonymity. Upon arrival we randomly assigned the visitors to one of the stations depending on the line of the waiting queue to minimize waiting times. While subjects waited they were asked to read the rules of the game which were hung up on the outside walls of the stations in private. If questions evolved, one experimenter explained the possible actions emphasizing the fact that all decisions are anonymous, but avoided to talk about the opportunity to cheat. In fact, we were cautious to ensure subjects understood that cheating was possible but avoided experimenter demand effects. 4 The next subject who waited in the line was given one plastic chip and one raffle ticket which was numbered uniquely. Each subject inserted the plastic chip into a gumball machine, drew either a white or a red marble and placed the marble into a sealed black box next to the gumball machine. Only if the draw of the marble showed a red color which occurs with a predetermined probability of 20%, subjects were allowed to place their raffle ticket into a red box which granted a chance of winning the monetary prize. Drawing a white marble represented a blank in which case subjects were asked to place their ticket into a white box. However, subjects are not observed during the draw so that cheating about the color of the marble is possible. Thus, subjects can easily draw a white marble but still insert their ticket into the red box, pretending to have drawn a red marble. In this aspect our design differs from other experiments, because cheating about the actual outcome does not guarantee a payoff with certainty, but rather more initiates the chance to win the monetary prize of the raffle. After deciding about the raffle ticket, subjects answered a questionnaire on the computer, 5 and, when leaving the station, subjects were marked with a stamp at the back of the hand to prevent a further participation in any remaining round. As soon as one round was finished the stations were closed and the tickets of the red box were placed into a raffle-drum. The experimenter chose at random one ticket out of the raffledrum and announced the ticket-number out loud. The subject who showed the matching part of the drawn winner-ticket was given the Amazon gift-certificate. Before the next round started, the number of tickets in the raffle-drum, the number of blanks in the white box and the number of drawn white and red marbles in the sealed black box were counted by the experimenter in private. The marbles were then put back into the gumball machine, the content of the gumball machine reshuffled, the black box re-sealed, and the raffle-drum emptied. Immediately after this procedure, the next round started and the stations were opened again for the next subjects. The key innovation of our experiment is that we can precisely evaluate deception rates. While available experiments compare the reported outcomes with a theoretical distribution (see for example Abeler et al., 2014; Bucciol & Piovesan, 2011; Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Hao & Houser, 2010; Shalvi et al., 2011a Shalvi et al., , 2011b , our design allows comparing in each round the actual empirical distribution of drawn marbles with the number of tickets we found in the raffle-drum. Thus, we have a direct measure to determine deception rates which are aggregated on the single rounds.
Hypotheses
Differences in lying costs across individuals and within individuals across different contexts are in particular explained by psychological theories. According to the theory of self-concept maintenance (Mazar et al., 2008) people allow themselves a limited amount of dishonesty as long as they are able to retain a positive view of their own (high) honesty. The fact to maintain a positive self-concept of the own morality constitutes costs of lying. It follows from this theory that the fact that only an indirect harm on others is incurred and the payoff of the lie is uncertain might make it easier to lie while maintaining a positive self-concept. In a similar vein, Lewicki (1983) proposes a behavioral model of lying in which the decision-maker evaluates the costs and benefits of deception. In his model, the underlying justification process leads to an underestimation of the psychological lying costs, especially if situational factors in form of extrinsic rewards are considered in the motivation to lie or not. Applied to professional contexts, uncertainty about outcomes caused by probabilistic future rewards might undermine the accurate perception of the psychological lying costs. This, in consequence, increases the likelihood of engaging in unethical behavior. Our first hypothesis is therefore formulated as: Hypothesis 1. Subjects lie about the color of the drawn marble.
Referring to the experimental lying and cheating literature in the field, Suri et al. (2011) investigate dishonest behavior in the labor market and use a non-student sample. Instead, people offering their work at Amazon's Mechanical Turk are recruited as subjects and the roll-dice game of Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) is conducted with them via the internet. Only little variation in cheating along individual and socio-economic characteristics is observed. Bucciol and Piovesan (2011) focus on another subpopulation and conduct a coin toss experiment with children between 5 and 15 in a summer camp in Italy. The probability to report the favorable outcome is uniform across age, gender and number of siblings. Pruckner and Sausgruber (2013) provide evidence for incomplete cheating in the field. In their experiment, customers are given the opportunity to take a newspaper out of a booth and pay less for the newspaper than specified. A subsequent survey reveals that characteristics of social behavior, such as spending time doing volunteering work, trust in the legal system and what other people think of oneself, are positively correlated with honesty. Abeler et al. (2014) conduct a coin toss experiment which was part of a 20 min interview for the German household panel survey. Surprisingly, contrary to laboratory findings they observe an almost truthful reporting of the coin toss outcomes. Further, there is no significant correlation between behavior and any individual characteristic. Given this empirical evidence, our second hypothesis is stated as:
Hypothesis 2. The prevalence of lying will be independent of individual characteristics.
Results
In the following, we firstly compare the actual distribution of red marbles with the tickets per round to investigate whether and by how much subjects cheated in the experiment. Secondly, we compare the reporting behavior of the red outcome across gender, age, educational level and professional status to examine potential correlations between reporting behavior and individual characteristics. Finally, a multivariate logistic estimation is used to support our findings from the non-parametric analysis.
Descriptive statistics
In total 252 subjects participated in our experiment. As displayed in Table 1 , subjects differ with regard to gender (130 male vs. 122 female), age (25% of subjects under 19 years old, 50% between 19% and 32%, and 25% above 32 years of age), highest educational level (more than 65% hold at least a high-school degree) and professional status (roughly one-third are either pupils, students or fully employed), providing a heterogeneous sample for the analysis. Tables 2 and 3 summarize the distribution of marbles and tickets for each round and station. 6 Overall, 64 red marbles were drawn out of 252 trials which means that the ex-post probability to draw a red marble amounts to 25.39%. As this empirical frequency of red marbles significantly differs from the ex-ante binomial distribution of 20% (Binomial Test, Pr > |z| = 0.0236) we use the empirical distribution to avoid any downward bias when we compare the frequency of drawn marbles with the reported outcomes. We therefore rate the distribution to be binomial with a 25.39% chance of drawing a red marble. Despite the fact that approximately 30% of the drawn marbles were red at station 1, 48.4% of the tickets were put in the red raffle box. 7 At station 2 this difference is even more pronounced. While roughly 23% of the drawn marbles were red, 50.3% tickets were inserted in the red raffle box at station 2. We pool our data as neither the distribution of red marbles nor the distribution of red tickets differ significantly across stations (Mann-Whitney U-test, Prob > |z| = 0.3518 and Prob > |z| = 0.8864 respectively).
Lying about the color of the drawn marble
As shown in Fig. 1 , the empirical proportion of red tickets aggregated over each round amounts to approximately 49.5% which is almost twice as high as expected from the empirical distribution of the drawn red marbles.
This difference of red tickets and red marbles is highly significant (Wilcoxon-Test for matched pairs, Prob > |z| = 0.0039) indicating that subjects cheated in our experiment. In fact, out of 188 subjects who drew a white marble, 61 subjects nevertheless inserted their ticket into the red box providing clean evidence that 32.44% of subjects cheated at the expense of others by reducing their chances to win the prize of the raffle.
As subjects are faced with a binary decision to lie or not to lie about the color of the marble, not reporting the outcome truthfully corresponds to completely lying. Referring to laboratory studies, the observed cheating rate is higher than cheating 6 Note: In 10 cases two marbles came at once when drawing on the gumball machine so that more marbles were recorded than expected from the number of subjects. We therefore take a conservative view and assume that all additional marbles were of red color so that the overall marble distribution favors the red outcome. 7 We denote tickets which were placed in the red box as red tickets and those which were placed in the white box as white tickets.
rates of ''completely lying''-subjects in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) , Shalvi et al. (2011a) with proportions of 22% and 20% respectively, and lower than reported in Houser et al. (2012) with cheating rates between 39% and 60%. Conversely, according to the proportions of white marbles and white tickets, roughly 68% of our subjects acted conformingly to the color of the drawn marble 8 which exceeds truth-telling behavior found in various laboratory experiments by far (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) : 39%, Hao and Houser (2010) : 44%, Houser et al. (2012): 51%). Thus, our first result suggests cheating rates on a medium level compared to laboratory findings and the vast majority of subjects tell the truth about the outcome of the drawn marble. Summarized, we find support for our first hypothesis. A significant proportion of subjects lied about the color of the marble.
The prevalence of lying across the different individual characteristics
As the single draw of the marble cannot be assigned to one individual we follow the literature and infer cheating behavior by assessing how frequently subjects report the red outcome. In the questionnaire at the end of our experiment subjects were asked in what box they inserted their raffle ticket. The number of red and white tickets which we recorded during the experiment corresponded hereby exactly to the number of subjects who stated in the questionnaire to have inserted their ticket in the red or white box, respectively. Thus, we can use these answers of the questionnaire to draw inferences about the cheating behavior. When comparing the frequency of the reported red outcomes with the empirical binomial distribution of the marbles, we find that in all subgroups referring to age, gender, educational level and professional status, subjects reported the red-marble-outcome significantly more than what the actual frequency of red marbles would suggest (see last column of Table 1 ). This finding clearly suggests that the tendency to cheat is ubiquitous and, hence, not subject to one or few subgroups with special socio-economic characteristics. However, in contrast to the study by Suri et al. (2011) , the strength of these tendencies differs among the groups. Subjects who are between 19 and 32 years old, hold a high-school degree or are students, report the red outcome significantly more than their corresponding counterparts (see second last column of Table 1 ). On the other hand, the reporting behavior does not differ when subgroups at the lower and upper extremes are compared with each other (age under 19 vs. above 32, lowest vs. highest educational status, pupils vs. fully-employed). The reporting behavior does not differ across gender, suggesting that deception in this kind of decision situation is commonly practiced among men and women. Overall, we can reject our second hypothesis that cheating behavior and individual characteristics are not correlated with each other.
Cheating behavior of students compared with pupils and fully-employed people
As age, educational level and professional status are highly correlated (see Table A1 in the appendix) we can reason that subjects who are between 19 and 32 years old and have a high-school degree are mostly students. Following the same argument, subjects who are under 19 years old and have the lowest educational background are mostly pupils, and, lastly, subjects above 32 years are fully employed and mostly have a college-degree. Reasoning along these lines suggests that the reporting behavior, and thus the tendency to cheat, is similar among pupils and fully-employed subjects, but comparably much more developed by students. We use a multivariate logistic regression to gain further insights in the magnitude of the difference between these subgroups. We run separate regressions for age, educational level and professional status because of strong correlations among the covariates discussed above. In all specifications shown in Table 4 , the dependent variable is the probability that the red outcome is reported while gender and the single rounds are used as control variables. As mentioned earlier, the student sample seems to inflate the red-marble-outcome more than the other groups, so we exactly use the socio-economic characteristics as reference groups which are highly correlated with being a student (age between 19 and 24 and high-school degree). Specification (1) underlines that the probability to report the red outcome is significantly reduced by more than 23% for pupils and roughly 20% for fully-employed subjects compared to students. This result is corroborated in specifications (2) and (3). The probability of reporting a red marble is significantly lower when subjects do not hold a high-school degree and do not belong to the typical age category for students. Overall, the regression analysis supports the findings of the non-parametric tests and reveals students to overstate the red-marble-outcome compared to the other sample groups such as pupils or fully-employed people. In neither specification gender has an effect on the reporting behavior. As the number of subjects participating in each round is not the same, the prevalence of cheating might be different as the expected gains from cheating across the rounds are not the same. Looking at the round dummies in the regressions, however, only in round 2 significantly fewer subjects report the red outcome, while in all other rounds the reporting behavior stays with minor exceptions the same. These results indicate that the share of cheaters is not affected by the number of subjects participating in one round.
Referring to the numbers of reporting the red-marble-outcome, it may be argued that all the subjects in one subgroup tell the truth and all the others are the ones who lie. For example it might be the case that out of the 64 red marbles, 58 were really drawn by the student sample and the remaining 6 by all other subjects. The situation can be equivalently formulated how probable it is to choose exactly 58 students out of 64 trials from a sample which has 87 students and 165 non-students. As the proportions of the subgroups do not differ across the rounds (Chi-Square Test, Prob > |z| = 0.152), each combination composed of 58 students and 6 others is equally likely. Using standard combinatorial methods for problems which involve sampling without replacement (DeGroot & Schervish, 2012) , the probability to observe 58 red marbles in the student sample and only 6 in all other subgroups together amounts to virtually zero (4.33eÀ28) 9 By the same logic it is highly unlikely that pupils (fully-employed subjects) are completely telling the truth as the probability to observe 34 (28) red marbles in the pupil (fully-employed) sample and 30 (36) in the other subgroups is also extremely tiny and close to zero: prob = 0.00001 (prob = 0.000022). Only in the last subgroup denoted by ''other'', the probability of observing the reported distribution of red marbles is moderately at 15.8%. Thus, we can clearly reject the concern that one subgroup might have been extremely fortunate when drawing a marble and therefore completely told the truth, while all the other subgroups lied about the color of the marble and overstated the red outcome.
Discussion and conclusion
Lying and cheating in professional contexts such as evading taxes, insurance fraud and untrue job application embody a great challenge for both the business world and society. Leaving aside sensational scams such as the downfalls of Enron and WorldCom, unethical behavior on small scales is frequently observed in business organizations reflected in faked CV's for a job application, forged accounting reports to attract investors or manipulated performance evaluations for the own promotion. Not only by the actual numbers on the tax gap and insurance fraud does it become evident that this seemingly minor unethical behavior cumulates to severe economic damages, but also in business organizations where this unethical behavior causes problems, as for example people are hired and promoted who are otherwise not appropriate for the job. What if exactly the aforementioned features of professional contexts promote dishonest behavior? While laboratory studies revealed important evidence about people's willingness to lie and provided valuable insights into how people find ways to justify and rationalize their questionable behavior, none of them is suited to address the question on how preferences for lying are shaped in situations typically found in professional contexts. We therefore investigate this question with our ''gumball-machine'' design which ensures that (1) the gain from the dishonest behavior is uncertain, (2) the harm that lying may cause to the other party is only indirect and (3) lies are more indirect lies by action or written statements. At the same time, we study the pervasiveness of lying behavior in the field and overcome the major concern about the low external validity of existing laboratory findings. Likewise, the innovative design of our experiment allows directly measuring cheating behavior under anonymous conditions rather than comparing coarsely cheating rates with a predetermined ex-ante distribution. Conducted during a University ''Open House Day'' with a heterogeneous subject sample we find clean evidence that all subgroups exhibit the propensity to lie. Our experiment which required a binary decision of either ''fully'' lying or telling the truth resulted in cheating rates of around 32% of the population which can be placed in an intermediate range compared with cheating rates found in laboratory studies. Surprisingly, truth-telling behavior amounts to roughly 68% which is far more than reported in any existing laboratory experiment. In contrast to previous findings from the field, cheating behavior is correlated with certain individual characteristics. Regarding highest educational level and professional status we find that students cheat significantly more than non-students, i.e. pupils and fully-employed subjects. As the financial standing of students and pupils is comparable, the higher cheating rates of students cannot be explained by the fact that students are tempted to cheat by their higher financial needs. This finding warrants a careful interpretation of generalizing laboratory findings with student subjects about the prevalence of cheating in the population.
Apparently, field experiments serve as an important empirical source to replicate behavioral cheating patterns found in laboratory studies. In addition to that, experiments conducted in a more natural environment or with a heterogeneous subject sample increases scientific knowledge about human conduct which might be especially important in the domain of lying and cheating. Thus, complementing laboratory research with field experiments offers a promising approach to gain further insights about lying preferences and strengthens the accurateness of possible policy implications. Hence, despite our first approach to move outside the lab and use a more heterogeneous subject sample, we can only speculate how patterns of cheating behavior prevail in even more natural professional contexts in which subjects do not even know that they are part of an experiment and interact with natural commodities they are familiar with.
In line with the framework suggested by Lewicki (1983) , observed lying behavior in our experiment might be explained by the fact that the professional context features of our design lead decision makers to underestimate the costs of lying. We referred to the psychological and business ethics literature which explained this behavior with self-deceit about the impact of cheating on the moral self-concept in certain situations. This implies for business organizations who might want to guard against the hazards following from dishonest behavior on the side of the employees to make this process of self-deception as difficult as possible. Transferring these conjectures to the domains of tax evasion and insurance fraud, making the negative consequences of unethical behavior on society salient to the individual may hamper the justification process for the lie and lead to an accurate perception of the lying costs (Lewicki, 1983) . Khalil (2009) points out that Adam Smith in his work ''The Theory of Moral Sentiments'' explained the existence of general rules in a society exactly with its role as a measure to protect people against falling victim of self-deceit as ''the fatal weakness of mankind.'' (Smith, 1982 (Smith, [1759 ). A similar role might be taken by a strong code of ethical conduct as part of the corporate culture in a business organization. Indeed, empirical findings by Mazar et al. (2008) , Bucciol and Piovesan (2011) tend to support the view that ethics codes in form of the Ten Commandments or appeals not to cheat decreases people's willingness to lie. A fruitful avenue for further research would therefore be to tailor ethics codes to specific professional contexts and investigate into possible interactions of individual and situational factors to make the corporate codes effective for individual moral behavior.
A.2. Derivation of complete honesty among subgroups
To determine whether one subgroup was extremely fortunate in drawing the marble and told the truth, while all other subgroups overstated the red outcome, we equivalently compute the probability to draw x subjects from one subgroup and all remaining subjects (64-x) from all the other subgroups out of 64 trials. This sampling without replacement problem can be solved as followed (DeGroot & Schervish, 2012) :
There are 87 students and 165 non-students. (1) Receipt of the raffle ticket and plastic chip red marble = win white marble = blank (2) Insertion of the plastic chip, turning of the mechanism and drawing of the marble from the gumball machine (3) Marble is to be placed into the sealed black box. (4a) white marble drawn? If 'blank' is drawn (white marble) put the complete raffle ticket into the blue box (4b) red marble drawn? If 'win' is drawn (red marble) put the red part of the ticket into the red box and keep the other part of the raffle ticket Step 5 of the experiment: answering the subsequent questionnaire.
On throwing in the raffle ticket:
• Your decision remains completely anonymous • None can match your thrown-on ticket to the marble you have drawn 
